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Abstract
This paper introduces an algorithm to compute stationary equilibria in stochastic games
that is guaranteed to converge for almost all such games. Since in general the number of
stationary equilibria is overwhelming, we pay attention to the issue of equilibrium selection.
We do this by extending the linear tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games, called the
stochastic tracing procedure. As a by-product of our results, we extend a recent result on the
generic ﬁniteness of stationary equilibria in stochastic games to oddness of equilibria.
r 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: C63; C72; C73
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1. Introduction
Many economic situations of interest can be modelled as a stochastic game.
Recent work of, for instance, Olley and Pakes [25], Pakes and Ericson [26], Pakes
and McGuire [27], and Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki [1] is devoted to the application of
stochastic games to problems emerging in the industrial organization literature. In
our opinion, further progress in this research program can be made by developing
methods to solve stochastic games numerically. Numerical solution methods allow
researchers to go back and forth between the implications of economic theory and
the characteristics of alternative datasets. See also [17,21] for an expression of the
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important role of computational methods in the further development of economic
theory.
The aim of this paper is to present an algorithm to compute a stationary
equilibrium for an arbitrary ﬁnite n-person discounted stochastic game. Even though
such a game may possess many non-stationary equilibria, there are good reasons to
focus on stationary equilibria. Several motivations for analyzing stationary
equilibria can be found in [20]. Stationary strategies prescribe the simplest form of
behavior that is consistent with rationality, stationarity captures the notion that
‘bygones are bygones’ more completely than does the concept of subgame-perfect
equilibrium, and it embodies the principle that ‘minor causes should have minor
effects’, that is, only those aspects of the past that are ‘signiﬁcant’ should have an
appreciable inﬂuence on behavior. The pragmatic motivations they give are that in
applied theory, the focus on stationary strategies allows for clean, unobstructed
analysis of the inﬂuence of the state variables, that stationary strategies substantially
reduce the number of parameters to be estimated in dynamic (econometric) models,
and that stationary models can be simulated.
Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [32]. He considered both ﬁnite and
inﬁnite horizon two-person zero-sum stochastic games with ﬁnite state space and
ﬁnite action spaces. Shapley proved that such games have a value and that both
players possess optimal stationary strategies with respect to the discounted payoff
criterion.
Fink [6], Takahashi [35], and Sobel [33] extended Shapley’s model to general
n-person stochastic games. For the model with a ﬁnite state space and ﬁnite action
spaces they showed the existence of a stationary equilibrium. In [2,3,5,31], the
problem of ﬁnding discounted stationary equilibria in a general n-person stochastic
game is reduced to that of ﬁnding a global minimum in a nonlinear program with
linear constraints. Solving this nonlinear program is equivalent to solving a certain
nonlinear system for which it is known that the objective value in the global
minimum is zero. But, as is noted in [2], the convergence of an optimization
algorithm to the global optimum is not guaranteed. The same convergence problems
occur in the work of Pakes and McGuire [27], who consider the case with continuous
strategy choices for the players. Since their algorithm is essentially an iterated best
reply algorithm, it cannot compute equilibria involving mixed strategies, which
implies nonconvergence for the substantial class of stochastic games without
equilibria in pure strategies.
For many normal form games there is a vast multiplicity of equilibria, see [24].
There is no reason to expect that the situation is different for the multiplicity of
stationary equilibria in stochastic games. For this reason, we also ﬁnd it essential to
provide an algorithm that selects a particular stationary equilibrium. All
computational methods mentioned so far do not make a systematic selection from
the set of equilibria. If there are multiple equilibria, the computed equilibrium will
typically depend on the starting point, which makes equilibrium selection essentially
random.
In this paper we propose an algorithm that is shown to converge to a stationary
equilibrium for a generic n-person stochastic game. The algorithm also deals with the
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equilibrium selection problem in that it computes the stationary equilibrium selected
by a natural extension of the linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten [10],
which we call the stochastic tracing procedure.
In [10] the tracing procedure is deﬁned for normal form games and for extensive
form games with a perfect recall information structure. Algorithms to compute the
Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure in normal form games are
proposed in [4,13,14]. For extensive form games, Harsanyi and Selten [10] ﬁrst
transform the game into one in standard form and subsequently deﬁne the tracing
procedure for that class of games. Computation of the Nash equilibrium selected by
the tracing procedure in extensive form games is the topic of von Stengel et al. [34],
who invoke the sequence form to calculate such equilibria efﬁciently. Since expected
utility in stationary strategies does not hold in stochastic games, it is not possible to
transform a stochastic game into one in standard form. The way to extend the
tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games is neither straightforward nor
unique.
The algorithm belongs to the class of homotopy methods, a class well-known
in economics thanks to the pioneering work of Scarf [30]. Apart from dealing
with the equilibrium selection problem, another advantage of our approach is
that we have been able to specify a differentiable homotopy. This makes it
possible to apply standard path-following techniques that are available in
professionally programmed software. This makes implementation on a computer
an easy exercise. As a by-product of the proof that the algorithm converges
for a generic stochastic game, we obtain the result that for a generic stochastic game
the stochastic tracing procedure yields a path leading to a unique stationary
equilibrium.
As another by-product of our convergence proof, we obtain an extension of a
recent result of Haller and Lagunoff [8]. Their main result is that the set of stationary
equilibria in a stochastic game is generically ﬁnite. A corollary to our main result is
that this ﬁnite number of equilibria is odd.
An alternative to the approach taken in this paper, would be to extend the
quantal-response method of McKelvey and Palfrey [22,23] to the class of stochastic
games. This would be very interesting as well, since it would also give rise to a
systematic method of equilibrium selection in stochastic games. If it is also possible
to develop an everywhere differentiable homotopy that computes that equilibrium
deserves to be studied in future work.
The paper has been organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model of the
ﬁnite discounted stochastic game. In Section 3 the restriction to stationary strategies
is made and the set of stationary equilibrium strategies is characterized. The
deﬁnition of the stochastic tracing procedure is given in Section 4. In Section 5, the
properties of the stochastic tracing procedure are studied. It is shown that for almost
every stochastic game, the stochastic tracing procedure is formed by a ﬁnite union of
arcs and loops. Using a well-chosen transformation of variables, the stochastic
tracing procedure is described by the zeros of an everywhere differentiable homotopy
function in Section 6. Section 7 discusses the implementation of the homotopy
algorithm and provides some numerical results.
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2. Finite discounted stochastic games
In this paper we study ﬁnite discounted stochastic games. Such a game is deﬁned
as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A finite discounted stochastic game is an ordered sextuple
G ¼ /N;O; fSiogði;oÞANO; fuigiAN ; p; dS;
where N; O and Sio are ﬁnite non-empty sets, So ¼ iAN Sio; ui is a real-valued
function on the set H ¼ fðo; soÞ joAO; soASog; where p is a map p : H-DðOÞ
with DðOÞ the family of probability distributions on the space O and d is a discount
factor.
The game parameters have the following meaning.
* N ¼ f1;y; ng is the player set.
* O ¼ fo1;y;ozg is the state space.
* Sio ¼ fs1o1;y; siomiog is the action set of player iAN in state oAO:
* ui :H-R is the payoff function of player iAN; if in state oAO the players action
choices are so ¼ ðs1o;y; snoÞASo ¼ iAN Sio; then player i gets an instantaneous
payoff of uiðo; soÞ:
* p : H-DðOÞ is the transition map. For each ðo; soÞAH; we can identify pðo; soÞ
with the vector ðpðo1 jo; soÞ;y; pðoz jo; soÞÞ: Here pð %o jo; soÞ represents the
probability that the system jumps to state %o if in state o the strategy-tuple so is
played. Hence, pð %o jo; soÞX0 and
P
%oAOpð %o jo; soÞ ¼ 1:
* dAð0; 1Þ is the discount factor and is used to discount future payoffs.
Such a stochastic game corresponds to a dynamic system which can be in different
states and where at certain stages the players can inﬂuence the course of the play. We
consider the inﬁnite horizon model and the set of stages is assumed to be identical
with the set Zþ ¼ f0; 1;yg: Players know the game itself and that this knowledge is
common knowledge among all the players. Moreover, the initial state o0 at stage
k ¼ 0 is common knowledge to the players.
The game proceeds as follows. All players i select at the initial state,
simultaneously and independently of each other (possibly by a chance experiment)
an action sio0AS
i
o0 : Now two things happen, both depending on the current state o
0
and the action choices s1o0 ;y; s
n
o0 ;
(a) player i earns uiðo0; so0Þ;
(b) the system jumps to the next state o1 according to the outcome of a chance
experiment. The probability that the next state will be %o equals pð %o jo0; so0Þ:
Subsequently, prior to the next stage k ¼ 1; all players are informed about the
previous actions chosen by the players, and of the new state o1: At stage k ¼ 1; the
above procedure is repeated, starting from the state o1:
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We assume that the game is of perfect recall, i.e., at each stage each player
remembers all past actions chosen by all players and all past states that have
occurred. Note that for ﬁnite stochastic games, each stage game resembles a normal
form game. However, contrary to the situation with normal form games, the game
does not consist of a single play, but jumps according to the probability measure
pð
 jo; soÞ to the next state and continues dynamically. In choosing an action in a
certain state, a player not only takes into account the immediate payoff, but also his
opportunities in future states.
Like in normal form games, the players are allowed to randomize their pure
actions. A mixed strategy of player i in state o is a probability distribution on Sio:
We identify the set of all probability distributions on Sio with S
i
o ¼ DðSioÞ: For
sioAS
i
o; the probability assigned to pure strategy s
i
oj is given by s
i
oj: The strategy
space of the normal form game in state o is therefore equal to So ¼ iANSio: Given
a mixed strategy combination soASo and a strategy %sioAS
i
o; we denote by ðsio ; %sioÞ
the mixed strategy that results from replacing sio by %s
i
o: If a mixed strategy
combination soASo is played, then the instantaneous expected payoff of player i is
denoted by uiðo; soÞ and the expected transition to state %o by pð %o jo; soÞ:
At the different stages this randomization may depend on the history of the game
up to that stage.
Deﬁnition 2.2. A history up to a stage k is a sequence hk ¼
ðo0; so0 ;o1; so1 ;y;ok1; sok1Þ that could have occurred up to time k; kX1: Here
ok represents the state and sok the actions of the players at stage k; k ¼ 0;y; k  1:
Obviously, the set of histories up to time k equals Hk ¼ k1k¼0 H; i.e., the k-fold
Cartesian product of H:
Deﬁnition 2.3. A behavior strategy si for player i is a sequence si0; si1;y where
si0ASi ¼ oAOSio and sik : Hk-Si for all kX1:
So, a behavior strategy sik of player i speciﬁes for each stage k; each state ok at
time k; and each history hk a probability distribution sikðhk;okÞ on the action space
Siok of player i in state o
k: Then sikðsiok j hk;okÞ is the probability with which player i
chooses action siokAS
i
ok at time k if state o
k and history hk have occurred.
Given initial state o and strategy s; the stream of expected payoffs is evaluated by
Uiðo; sÞ :¼
XN
k¼0d
k 
 Uikðo; sÞ;
where Uikðo; sÞ denotes the expected instantaneous utility at stage k: Here, Uiðo; sÞ
equals the total discounted expected payoff of player i when the discount factor
equals d; the starting state is o and the strategy-tuple s is played. Since the state and
action spaces are assumed to be ﬁnite, Uiðo; sÞ exists.
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Deﬁnition 2.4. A strategy-tuple s is a Nash equilibrium if and only if si is a best
response to si for all iAN:
If n ¼ 2 and the payoffs are zero-sum, then the deﬁnition characterizes a minimax
solution (see [32]).
3. Stationary equilibria
In the sequel of this paper we will restrict ourselves to stationary equilibria.1
Before coming to the deﬁnition of a stationary equilibrium, ﬁrst the concept of a
stationary strategy has to be deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 3.1. A stationary strategy ri for player i is an element of Si:
So, a stationary strategy for player i is a behavior strategy for which sikðhk;okÞ is
of the form siðokÞ; i.e., a stationary strategy is a history and time independent
strategy which depends on the state only. In the sequel, a stationary strategy for
player i will be denoted by the symbol ri: We deﬁne ri ¼ ðrio1 ;y; riozÞ; where rio is a
probability measure on the action space Sio for each oAO: So r
i
oAS
i
o: If player i
decides to play the stationary strategy riASi; then every time that the system is in
state o; player i selects his pure action according to rio:
Suppose that o is the initial state and the players decide to play a stationary
strategy-tuple r: The total discounted expected payoff of player i is denoted by
Uiðo; rÞ: The instantaneous payoff player i obtains in stage k ¼ 0 equals uiðo; roÞ:
The probability that at the next stage the state will be %o equals pð %o jo; roÞ: This
gives rise to the following theorem (see e.g. [6]).
Theorem 3.2. When r is a stationary strategy-tuple and o is the initial state, the
expected payoffs are given by the following recursive formula:
Uiðo; rÞ ¼ uiðo; rÞ þ d 

X
%oAO
pð %o jo; roÞUið %o; rÞ:
Deﬁnition 3.3. A stationary strategy-combination rAS is a stationary equilibrium if
it is a Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies.
It is a very well-known result that there exists a stationary best response to
stationary strategies ri: Therefore, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 3.4. A stationary strategy-combination %rAS is a stationary equilibrium if for
all i and all o
Uiðo; %rÞXUiðo; %ri; riÞ; riASi:
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Another famous result, see Fink [6,35] or [33], is the existence of a stationary
equilibrium.
Theorem 3.5. Every finite discounted stochastic game has a stationary equilibrium.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the characterization of the set of
stationary equilibria that is useful for numerical computations. Given that the other
players play ri and the initial state is %o; player i faces the Markov decision problem
of maximizing
Uið %o; ri; riÞ
over ri;2 subject to
riojX0; ðsiojASio;oAOÞ;X
siojAS
i
o
rioj  1 ¼ 0; ðoAOÞ
for all possible initial states %oAO: If we deﬁne by mioðkÞ the present value of the total
expected payoff for a system in state o with k transitions remaining, we obtain the
basic recurrence relation
mioðk þ 1Þ ¼ uiðo; roÞ þ d 

X
%oAO
pð %o jo; roÞmi%oðkÞ
or in vector form
miðk þ 1Þ ¼ uiðrÞ þ dPðrÞmiðkÞ:
Note that3
mi ¼ lim
k-N
miðkÞ ¼ lim
k-N
Xk1
c¼0
ðdPðrÞÞcuiðrÞ þ ðdPðrÞÞkmið0Þ
 !
¼
XN
c¼0
ðdPðrÞÞcuiðrÞ ¼ ½I  dPðrÞ1uiðrÞ:
The vector mi may be called the vector of present values of player i; because each of
its elements mio is the present value of an inﬁnite number of future expected payoffs
discounted by the discount factor d with o the initial state.
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Because we are interested in the sequential decision process for large k (in fact for
k equal to inﬁnity), we substitute the present values mio ¼ limk-N mioðkÞ for the
quantities mioðkÞ to obtain the recursive relation
mio ¼ uiðo; roÞ þ d 

X
%oAO
pð %o jo; roÞmi%o:
Given that the other players play ri; player i maximizes mio subject to r
i
oAS
i
o for all
oAO:
Because player i maximizes each mio for oAO; he also maximizes
P
oAOm
i
o: Given
that the other players play ri; player i maximizesX
oAO
mio
subject to
uiðo; rio ;rioÞ þ d 

X
%oAO
pð %o jo; rio ; rioÞmi%o  mio ¼ 0 ðoAOÞ;
riojX0 ðsiojASio;oAOÞ;X
siojAS
i
o
rioj  1 ¼ 0 ðoAOÞ:
The necessary and sufﬁcient ﬁrst-order conditions for this maximization
problem are
aiofuiðo; rio ; siojÞ þ d 

X
%oAO
pð %o jo; rio ; siojÞmi%og þ bioj  gio ¼ 0
ðsiojASio;oAOÞ;
biojX0; r
i
ojX0; b
i
ojr
i
oj ¼ 0 ðsiojASio;oAOÞ;X
siojAS
i
o
rioj  1 ¼ 0 ðoAOÞ;
uiðo; rio ;rioÞ þ d 

X
%oAO
pð %o jo; rio ; rioÞmi%o  mio ¼ 0 ðoAOÞ;
ai½I  dPðri; riÞ ¼ 1:
Here, a; b and g are the Lagrange multipliers of the ﬁrst, second and third set of
constraints, and 1 denotes the vector containing ones only. Then, by multiplying by
rioj and summing over j; for r
i a best response to ri;
0 ¼ aiofuiðo; rio ;rioÞ þ d 

X
%oAO
pð %o jo; rio ; rioÞmi%og
þ
X
siojAS
i
o
biojr
i
oj 
X
siojAS
i
o
gior
i
oj
¼ aiomio  gio
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for all oAO: Therefore, since ai ¼ ½I  dPðri; riÞ11 ¼ 1
1d1c0;
4
gio
aio
¼ mio:
After division by aio; the following necessary and sufﬁcient conditions remain, where
lioj is deﬁned as the ratio of b
i
oj and a
i
o:
uiðo; rio ; siojÞ þ d 

X
%oAO
pð %o jo; rio ; siojÞmi%o þ lioj  mio ¼ 0
ðsiojASio;oAOÞ;
liojX0; r
i
ojX0; l
i
ojr
i
oj ¼ 0 ðsiojASio;oAOÞ;X
siojAS
i
o
rioj  1 ¼ 0 ðoAOÞ:
Here, lioj is the shadowprice of playing strategy s
i
oj ; i.e., the disutility from a one-shot
deviation at t ¼ 0 of a marginal increase in the probability rioj by which pure strategy
sioj is played, and m
i
o is the expected payoff of player i when the initial state is o; r
i
is played by his opponents, and player i chooses a best response. The last equality,P
siojAS
i
o
rioj  1 ¼ 0; makes sure that rio is a member of Sio for all oAO:
Since for a stationary equilibrium it holds that a strategy-tuple constitutes
mutually best responses, we have found that the set of stationary equilibria can be
fully characterized by the system of equalities and inequalities in Theorem 3.6.
Theorem 3.6. A strategy rAS is a stationary equilibrium if and only if it is part of a
solution to
uiðo; rio ; siojÞ þ d 

X
%oAO
pð %o jo; rio ; siojÞmi%o þ lioj  mio ¼ 0
ðsiojASio;oAO; iANÞ;
liojX0; r
i
ojX0; l
i
ojr
i
oj ¼ 0 ðsiojASio;oAO; iANÞ;X
siojAS
i
o
rioj  1 ¼ 0 ðoAO; iANÞ:
The system above suggests that only one-shot deviations have to be considered.
We explain intuitively the reason of this surprising phenomenon often referred to as
the one-deviation property.
Suppose the other players play stationary strategies ri and suppose that ri is the
best stationary response of player i: If player i is not able to improve his utility by a
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deviation to his strategy ri in one stage only, then it follows by a backward induction
argument, that neither ﬁnitely many deviations to his strategy will make player i
better off. Suppose now that player i can improve his utility by inﬁnitely many
changes. Then, by a proﬁt-to-go argument, player i can also increase his payoff by
ﬁnitely many changes, which is not possible.5
We end this section with an example in which it is shown that expected utility in
stationary strategies does not hold for the class of stochastic games. This causes a
number of technical difﬁculties for the convergence proof of our algorithm.
Example 3.7. The stochastic game of Fig. 1 is a game in which there are two states
pH and pL and one player. In each state the player can choose between actions qH
and qL: In the upper-left corner of each square the intermediate payoff of the player
is displayed. In the lower-right corner the transition probabilities are given. So, if the
player chooses qH when the state is pH; then he earns 1 today and the next state will
be pL with probability 1. If the player chooses qL when the state is pL; then he earns 1
today and the next state will be pH for sure. Future payoffs are discounted by a
factor 1/2.
Consider the strategies r ¼ ðqL; qHÞ and rþ ¼ ðqH; qLÞ; where the ﬁrst argument
is the strategy when the state is pH and the second when the state is pL: Then
UðpL; rÞ ¼ UðpH; rÞ ¼ 1; UðpL; rþÞ ¼ 2=3 and UðpH; rþÞ ¼ 4=3:
However,
UðpH; 12 r þ 12 rþÞ ¼ 65a76 ¼ 12 
 1þ 12 
 43 ¼ 12 UðpH; rÞ þ 12 UðpH; rþÞ;
UðpL; 12 r þ 12 rþÞ ¼ 45a56 ¼ 12 
 1þ 12 
 23 ¼ 12 UðpL; rÞ þ 12 UðpL; rþÞ:
So, expected utility does not hold.
Next we provide an example that shows that even for a stochastic game with two
players the ordered ﬁeld property does not hold, i.e. even if all exogenous variables
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Fig. 1. Example to show that the expected utility property does not hold.
5Deﬁne M ¼ maxði;o;soÞjuiðo; soÞj: Then the maximum payoff a player can earn from time k on is
bounded from above by dkð1þ dþ d2 þ?ÞM ¼ dk
1d M; the so-called maximum ‘proﬁt-to-go’ value.
Suppose player i is able to improve his utility by e by means of inﬁnitely many changes. When k grows
large the proﬁt-to-go value is at a certain point less then e (this is when k4log ðeð1dÞ
M
Þ=logðdÞ). This means
that the utility improvement by changes until time k (ﬁnitely many changes) was positive.
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of the game are rational numbers, it is still possible that equilibrium strategies
involve irrational numbers. In the literature on the computation of Nash equilibria
in normal form games, a distinction is made between 2-player games on the one hand
and 3 or more players on the other hand. For the class of 2-player games exact
algorithms are possible, because of the bilinear structure of such games (see, for
instance the algorithm of Lemke and Howson [18]). For stochastic games this
distinction disappears. The system of equations of Theorem 3.6 is not bilinear, even
for 2-player games.
Example 3.8. The stochastic game of Fig. 2 originates from Parthasarathy and
Raghavan [28]. The game has two states. In the ﬁrst state player 1 is the row player
and has two pure actions and player 2 is the column player and also has two pure
actions. In the second state both players have one action only. The transition
probabilities (displayed in the right-lower corners) show that once state 2 is reached,
it will never leave this state. The numbers in the left-upper corners specify the
amount player 2 has to pay to player 1 (this game is of the zero-sum type).
The only equilibrium in this stochastic game is both players playing (in state 1 of
course) the ﬁrst action with probability
3þ 1
3
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
13
p  2 
4þ 2
3
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
13
p  2 
and the second with probability
1þ 1
3
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
13
p  2 
4þ 2
3
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
13
p  2 :
So, the data of the game and the solution to the game are not in the same
Archimedean ﬁeld.
Although that this 2-player stochastic game has only rational numbers of payoffs
and transition probabilities, the unique Nash equilibrium involves strategies with
irrational probabilities. This means that the ordered ﬁeld property does not hold. A
straightforward application of a Lemke–Howson type algorithm to 2-player
stochastic games is therefore not possible. This shows one more time that the class
of stochastic games is considerably more difﬁcult than the class of normal form
games.
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4. The stochastic tracing procedure
The linear tracing procedure as presented in Harsanyi and Selten [10] models a
process of convergent expectations by which rational players will come to adopt, and
expect each other to adopt, a particular equilibrium as a solution for a given game.
Before applying the tracing procedure, every player is assumed to have a subjective
probability distribution expressing his expectation about the strategic choices of the
other players. Each player is assumed to use the same theory to determine his
subjective probability distributions, which makes that all players have the same
expectations about the other players. This common subjective probability distribu-
tion is called the prior. In the naive Bayesian approach, all players choose best
responses to their prior beliefs and would in this way reach a strategy-combination
that does not constitute an equilibrium in general. In the linear tracing procedure,
the information on the best responses is only gradually fed back into the
expectations of the players. As the linear tracing procedure proceeds, both the
priors and their best responses will gradually change until both converge to some
equilibrium of the game.
In Harsanyi and Selten [10] the linear tracing procedure is deﬁned for normal form
games and for extensive form games with a perfect recall information structure. For
a normal form game G ¼ /N; fSigiAN ; fuigiANS and a prior pAS the linear tracing
procedure is deﬁned by tracing a curve in the set of Nash equilibria of the games
Gt ¼ /N; fSigiAN ; fu˜iðtÞgiANS for tA½0; 1; where u˜iðt; sÞ ¼ ð1 tÞuiðpi; siÞ þ tuiðsÞ:
For extensive form games, they ﬁrst transform the game into one in standard form
and subsequently deﬁne the tracing procedure for that class of games. They did not
deﬁne the tracing procedure for stochastic games, which are games with
instantaneous payoffs and inﬁnite time horizon. Since expected utility in stationary
strategies does not hold in stochastic games (see Example 3.7) it is not possible to
transform this game into one in standard form. The extension of the tracing
procedure to the class of stochastic games is far from obvious.
There are at least four ways to extend the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and
Selten to the setting of stochastic games. Choices have to be made whether a player
holds correlated beliefs within a state or not, and whether a player holds correlated
beliefs across time or not. For the extension of the linear tracing procedure to
stochastic games that we study in this paper, we assume that beliefs are correlated
within states and that they are not correlated across time.
Correlation within states means that when a player knows that some opponent
plays according to the prior (which he expects with probability 1 t), he expects all
opponents to play according to the prior. This is equivalent to the way Harsanyi and
Selten deﬁne the tracing procedure for normal form games.
Absence of correlation across time means that even when a player knows that his
opponents are playing according to the prior today, these opponents might not play
according to the prior in future stages. In all future events he faces independent
lotteries which assigns probability 1 t to play against the prior strategies of his
opponents. Assuming that beliefs are not correlated across time captures the
ARTICLE IN PRESS
P.J.J. Herings, R.J.A.P. Peeters / Journal of Economic Theory 118 (2004) 32–60 43
assumption of stationarity. The beliefs of a player depend only on the state reached
and not on the time at which it is reached. A more extensive discussion on the
deﬁnition of the stochastic tracing procedure is the issue of Herings and Peeters [15].
Fix some stochastic game G and some prior pAS: For every tA½0; 1; the stochastic
tracing procedure generates a stationary equilibrium of the stochastic game
Gt ¼ /N;O; fSiogoAO;iAN ; fu˜iðtÞgiAN ; f *piðtÞgiAN ; dS;
where the instantaneous payoff function u˜iðtÞ : H-R of player i is deﬁned by
u˜iðt;o; soÞ ¼ ð1 tÞuiðo; pio ; sioÞ þ tuiðo; soÞ
and where the transition mapping *piðtÞ is deﬁned by
*piðt; %o jo; soÞ ¼ ð1 tÞpð %o jo; pio ; sioÞ þ tpð %o jo; soÞ:
Note that *piðtÞ may be different for different players when to1: This is consistent
with the fact that the tracing procedure should be thought of as a reasoning process.
The mapping *piðtÞ should be thought of as what the players think that the transition
probabilities are in the stochastic game Gt: The expected payoff of player i is easily
shown to satisfy the recursive relation
U˜iðt;o; rÞ ¼ u˜iðt;o; roÞ þ d 

X
%oAO
*piðt; %o jo; roÞU˜iðt; %o; rÞ:
The stochastic game G0 corresponds to a trivial stochastic game, where all players
believe that all their opponents play with probability 1 according to the prior belief.
The stochastic game G1 coincides with the original stochastic game G: A best
response against a strategy combination riASi in the stochastic game Gt
corresponds to a best response against the stationary probability distribution
ð1 tÞ½pi þ t½ri on Si in the stochastic game G:
The stochastic tracing procedure SðG; pÞ is deﬁned as the set of pairs ðt; rÞ for
which it holds that r is a stationary equilibrium of the stochastic game Gt; i.e.,
SðG; pÞ ¼ fðt; rÞA½0; 1  S j r is a stationary equilibrium of Gtg:
The stochastic tracing procedure is said to be feasible if there exists a path inSðG; pÞ
connecting a best response against the prior to a stationary equilibrium of the
stochastic game G; i.e., there exists a continuous function g : ½0; 1-SðG; pÞ such that
gð0ÞASðG; pÞ-ðf0g  SÞ and gð1ÞASðG; pÞ-ðf1g  SÞ: In general there may be
many trajectories gð½0; 1Þ that link a stationary equilibrium of G0 to a stationary
equilibrium of G1: If this trajectory is unique, then the stochastic tracing procedure is
said to be well-deﬁned. If the stochastic tracing procedure is well-deﬁned, then it
selects a unique stationary equilibrium of the stochastic game G:
For a simple proof of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure for normal
form games see Herings [12] and for the well-deﬁnedness see Herings and Peeters
[14]. The derivation of such properties for the stochastic tracing procedure is part of
present paper.
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5. Structure of the stochastic tracing procedure
The size of any stochastic game G can be characterized by a vector Z ¼
ðn; z; fmiogi¼1;y;no¼1;y;zÞ; specifying the number of players, the number of states, and the
number of pure strategies available to a player in a state. We will call Z the size vector
of a stochastic game G: For any possible size vector Z; transition map p consistent
with Z and discount factor d; the set GðZ; p; dÞ of all stochastic games G possessing Z
as their size vector, having p as their transition map, and d as discount factor, is
called the size class generated by ðZ; p; dÞ:
Every stochastic game G in the size class GðZ; p; dÞ is characterized by a vector uðGÞ
that contains exactly nm payoffs, where m ¼ jSj ¼Qði;oÞANO mio: We identify a
stochastic game G with the vector uðGÞ; and we identify the size class GðZ; p; dÞ with
the set of all possible real vectors of size nm; that is, with an nm-dimensional
Euclidean space. It is now possible to deﬁne the distance RðG;G0Þ between two
stochastic games and the Lebesgue measure of a set of stochastic games.
A given mathematical statementZ is said to be true for an open set of (almost all,
set of generic) stochastic games if, for every possible size class GðZ; p; dÞ; the set *GðZÞ
of all stochastic games G in GðZ; p; dÞ for which the statement Z is true is open (has
full Lebesgue measure, is open and of full Lebesgue measure) with respect to
GðZ; p; dÞ:
Fix Z; p and d:6 Let a subset B of S ¼ Sði;oÞANO Sio be given with the property
that for every player i and for every state o there is at least one pure strategy sioj in
B; so Bio ¼ B-Sioa|; for every player i; for every state o: Such a set B is called
admissible. The sets B are used to decompose SðG; pÞ in subsets SðG; p; BÞ; each
having a differentiable manifold structure. The set SðG; p; BÞ contains those
elements of SðG; pÞ where only strategies in B are played with positive probability.
It is deﬁned by
SðG; p; BÞ ¼ ðt;rÞASðG; pÞ
siojeB
 ) rioj ¼ 0
siojAB
 ) siojA argmax
siocAS
i
o
U˜iðt;o; ri;rio; siocÞ







9=
;:
8<
:
It follows that
SðG; pÞ ¼
[
B
SðG; p; BÞ:
Two sets SðG; p; BÞ and SðG; p; %BÞ can only have a point ðt; rÞ in common
if there is a player i and a strategy sioj such that r
i
oj ¼ 0 and
siojAargmaxsiocASio U˜
iðt;o; ri; rio; siocÞ; so sioj is a best response to ðri; rioÞ that
is played with probability zero.
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To analyze the structure of SðG; pÞ and the setsSðG; p; BÞ; we design systems of
equalities and inequalities whose solutions characterize these sets. By Theorem 3.6,
an element ðt; rÞ belongs to SðG; pÞ if and only if it is part of a solution to
u˜iðt;o; rio ; siojÞ þ d 

X
%oAO
*piðt; %o jo; rio ; siojÞmi%o þ lioj  mio ¼ 0
ðsiojASio;oAO; iANÞ;
liojX0; r
i
ojX0; l
i
ojr
i
oj ¼ 0 ðsiojASio;oAO; iANÞ;X
siojAS
i
o
rioj  1 ¼ 0 ðoAO; iANÞ:
Given an admissible subset B; we deﬁne OðG; p; BÞ as the set of solutions ðt; r; l; mÞ
to the following system of equalities and inequalities:
ð1Þ u˜iðt;o; rio ; siojÞ þ d 

P
%oAO
*piðt; %o jo; rio ; siojÞmi%o þ lioj  mio ¼ 0;
ðsiojASio;oAO; iANÞ;
ð2Þ rioj ¼ 0 ðsiojeBio;oAO; iANÞ;
ð3Þ lioj ¼ 0 ðsiojABio;oAO; iANÞ;
ð4Þ P
siojAS
i
o
rioj  1 ¼ 0 ðoAO; iANÞ;
ð5Þ riojX0 ðsiojABio;oAO; iANÞ;
ð6Þ liojX0 ðsiojeBio;oAO; iANÞ;
ð7Þ tX0;
ð8Þ 1 tX0:
Every solution of system (1)–(8) is a solution of the system in Theorem 3.6, hence an
equilibrium.
The fact that for stochastic games the system of equalities and inequalities differs
from the case of normal form games, is not the only difﬁculty. Since expected utility
does not hold, we cannot use any property that is derived from it. In particular, it is
not even obvious that there is a unique best response to the prior in pure stationary
strategies.
Theorem 5.1 implies that ðt; rÞASðG; p; BÞ if and only if there exists lARm and
mARnz such that equalities (1)–(4) and inequalities (5)–(8) are satisﬁed, where m ¼
jSj ¼Pði;oÞANOmio:
Theorem 5.1. Let a stochastic game GAGðZ; p; dÞ and a prior pAS be given. For all
admissible subsets B of S; the sets SðG; p; BÞ and OðG; p; BÞ are CN diffeomorphic.
Proof. Let B be an admissible subset of S: For every iAN and oAO take an
element %sioAB
: Deﬁne a function f : ½0; 1  S-R Rm  Rm  Rnz by f ðt; rÞ ¼
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ðt; r; l; mÞ; where (in vector form with a slight abuse of notation) mi ¼ ½I  d 

*Piðt; ri; %siÞ1u˜iðt;ri; %siÞ and lioc ¼ mio  u˜iðt;o; rio ; siocÞ  d 

P
%oAO *p
iðt; %o j
o; rio ; s
i
ocÞmi%o: Then f ðt; rÞAOðG; p; BÞ if and only if ðt; rÞASðG; p; BÞ: Note that
f deﬁned in this way is a CN diffeomorphism. &
From Theorem 5.1 it follows that for all ðt; rÞASðG; p; BÞ there is a unique l and
a unique m such that ðt; r; l; mÞAOðG; p; BÞ: Vice versa, for all ðt; r; l; mÞAOðG; p; BÞ
it holds that ðt; rÞASðG; p; BÞ:
The analysis of the system of equalities and inequalities (1)–(8) provides the
following result.
Theorem 5.2. There exists an open set of stochastic games and priors
ðG; pÞAGðZ; p; dÞ  S with full Lebesgue measure such that for all admissible subsets
B of S; SðG; p; BÞ is a compact 1-dimensional CN manifold with boundary.
Moreover, a boundary point ðt; rÞ of SðG; p; BÞ is either
(i) not a boundary point of SðG; p; %BÞ for all %BaB and lies in f0; 1g  S; or
(ii) is a boundary point of exactly one SðG; p; %BÞ with %BaB and belongs to ð0; 1Þ 
S: Moreover, B and %B differ in exactly one element, say sioj; for which r
i
oj ¼ 0
and sioj is a best response to r in G
t:
Proof. The proof of this theorem is analogous to the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 of
Herings and Peeters [14], and involves three lemmas. The only thing left to do is to
prove those lemmas for the stochastic game situation, which is done in Appendix A.
The inference is then analogously to the proofs of Herings and Peeters [14], since it
only uses the structural manifold properties of the lemmas.
In Lemma A.1, we prove that the set of solutions to (1)–(8) is 1-dimensional if
the inequalities are strict. Then in Lemma A.2, we prove that the set of solutions to
(1)–(8) is zero-dimensional if exactly one of the inequalities is binding. Finally,
it is proved in Lemma A.3 that there is no solution to (1)–(8) with more than one
binding inequality.
It follows that OðG; p; BÞ is a 1-dimensional manifold with boundary. A point in
OðG; p; BÞ is a boundary point if and only if exactly one of the inequalities in (5)–(8)
holds with equality. By Theorem 5.1 these properties carry over to SðG; p; BÞ:
It is easily seen that for a boundary point alternative (i) holds when the binding
inequality comes from (7) or (8) and that alternative (ii) holds when the binding
inequality comes from (5) or (6). &
This theorem implies that, for almost every G and p; for all admissible sets B of S
the set SðG; p; BÞ consists of a ﬁnite number of smooth arcs and loops.7 Each arc
has two boundary points. The structure of SðG; p; BÞ is therefore a simple one; all
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kinds of complications like bifurcations, spirals, higher dimensional solution sets,
diverging behavior, etc. are excluded.
IfSðG; p; BÞ has a boundary point in ð0; 1Þ  S; then there is a unique admissible
subset %BaB such that SðG; p; %BÞ has this boundary point in common with
SðG; p; BÞ: The cardinality of %B is one less or one greater than the cardinality of
B; depending on whether in the common boundary point a strategy in B is played
with probability zero, or whether a strategy not in B is a best response. The
uniqueness of the set %B implies that the sets SðG; p; BÞ and SðG; p; %BÞ are nicely
linked to each other.
If SðG; p; BÞ has a boundary point in f0; 1g  S; then this point does not belong
to any other set SðG; p; %BÞ: This implies that such a boundary point is also a
boundary point of SðG; pÞ:
Formally, the structure of SðG; pÞ is as follows.
Theorem 5.3. There exists an open set of stochastic games and priors
ðG; pÞAGðZ; p; dÞ  S with full Lebesgue measure such that SðG; pÞ is a compact 1-
dimensional piecewise CN manifold with boundary. The boundary of SðG; pÞ is given
by the intersection of SðG; pÞ and f0; 1g  S: There is a unique boundary point in
f0g  S which corresponds to a strategy-combination in pure strategies.
Proof. The intuition of the proof of the ﬁrst part of this theorem is given in the text
above the theorem. A rigorous proof can be given using the Lemke-Howson argument.
For a rigorous development of this argument, see for instance Herings and Peeters [14].
The second part of the theorem, that there is generically a unique boundary point
in f0g  S and that this boundary point is in pure strategies, remains to be shown.
Suppose there is a best response %ri to the prior in mixed strategies. Then for some
state o player i plays under %ri at least two pure strategies with positive probability
mass, say s1o1 and s
1
o2: Since %r
i is an optimal strategy it is part of a solution to the
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions above Theorem 3.6. So,
l1o1 ¼ l1o2 ¼ 0
and
uiðo; pio ; sio1Þ þ d 

X
%oAO
pð %o jo; pio ; sio1Þmi%o ¼ mio
¼ uiðo; pio ; s1o2Þ þ d 

X
%oAO
pð %o jo; pio ; s1o2Þmi%o:
It follows that every strategy ri with rio1; r
1
o2X0 and r
i
fo1;o2g ¼ %rifo1;o2g is a best
response to the prior. This contradicts the local ﬁniteness of the number of solutions
at t ¼ 0: Therefore, generically, all best responses are in pure strategies.
Suppose there are two pure best responses %ri and #ri against the prior. Then
%mio ¼ #mio for all oAO: Take ri ¼ 12 %ri þ 12 #ri; mi ¼ %mi; and lioj ¼ 0 if rioj40 and lioj ¼
%lioj otherwise. Now indeed the complementarity conditions are satisﬁed and r
i is a
member of Si:
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Suppose rioj40: Then it holds that %r
i
oj40 or #r
i
oj40; suppose without loss of
generality that %rioj40: Then
0 ¼ uiðo; pio ; siojÞ þ d 

X
%oAO
pð %o jo; pio ; siojÞ %mi%o  %mio
¼ uiðo; pio ; siojÞ þ d 

X
%oAO
pð %o jo; pio ; siojÞmi%o þ lioj  mio:
Suppose rioj ¼ 0: Then it holds that %rioj ¼ 0 and therefore lioj ¼ %lioj: The equalities
above hold again.
It follows that ri is a best response to the prior. This contradicts that, generically,
best responses are pure. &
For almost every G and p; the set SðG; pÞ consists of a ﬁnite number of arcs and
loops. Although it is not necessarily the case that these arcs and loops are smooth,
the number of nondifferentiabilities is ﬁnite at most. Theorem 5.2 implies that all
arcs in SðG; pÞ start and end in f0; 1g  S: Each such path consists of a ﬁnite
sequence of smooth arcs of the setsSðG; p; BÞ: A loop inSðG; pÞ consists either of a
ﬁnite sequence (at least two) of differentiable arcs of the setsSðG; p; BÞ or is a loop
of a set SðG; p; BÞ: See Fig. 3 for an impression of the structure of SðG; pÞ:
Generically, each player i has a unique best response to the prior for all possible
initial states, so generically there is exactly one point of SðG; pÞ that belongs to
f0g  S: This point is both a corner point of f0g  S and a boundary point of
SðG; p; BÞ; where B consists of the following nz strategies: for each possible initial
state and for each player the best response to the prior. Given some initial state o;
the determination of the best response against the prior in state o; involves the
determination of the behavior in all other states %o as well. So the nz independent
strategies are found by solving n optimization problems, as opposed to nz
independent optimization problems. By Theorem 5.3 this point is the starting point
of a uniquely deﬁned arc of SðG; pÞ: This arc is the unique feasible path of SðG; pÞ
that transforms prior beliefs into (stationary) equilibrium beliefs.
Theorem 5.4. There exists an open set of stochastic games and priors
ðG; pÞAGðZ; p; dÞ  S with full Lebesgue measure such that the stochastic tracing
procedure is well defined.
By following the feasible path starting in the unique point SðG; pÞ-ðf0g-SÞ we
ﬁnd a stationary equilibrium of the stochastic game G: The set SðG; pÞ-ðf1g  SÞ
consists of all stationary equilibria of the stochastic game G: Precisely one of these
stationary equilibria is an element of the feasible path of SðG; pÞ: Any other
stationary equilibrium is a boundary point of SðG; pÞ and is therefore part of some
arc of SðG; pÞ: A moment of reﬂection makes clear that the remaining stationary
equilibria are pairwise connected by arcs from SðG; pÞ; and so the number of
stationary equilibria is odd.
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Theorem 5.5. There exists an open set of stochastic games GAGðZ; p; dÞ with full
Lebesgue measure such that the number of stationary equilibria is odd.
The generic oddness of the number of Nash equilibria in normal form games is a
well-known result of [9,29,39]. The generic ﬁniteness of the number of stationary
equilibria in stochastic games is a recent result of Haller and Lagunoff [8]. Theorem
5.5 shows that Haller and Lagunoff’s result can be sharpened to oddness.
The observations made so far suggest the following algorithm for the computation
of the stationary equilibrium selected by the stochastic tracing procedure in n-person
stochastic games. Deﬁne the admissible set B that contains for each player i the best
response to the prior for all possible initial states, and start with a point ð0; rÞ in
SðG; p; BÞ such that rio is a best response of player i to the prior when o is the initial
state. Theorem 5.3 implies that B and r are uniquely determined. Equalities (1)–(4)
belonging to this B determine at least a part of the feasible path. As long as
inequalities (5)–(8) hold with strict inequality we do not change our B: As soon as
one of the inequalities from (5) or (6) gets binding, we change B: When the binding
inequality belongs to (5), say rioj ¼ 0 while siojAB; we delete sioj out of B:
Obviously, this cannot happen for the starting B: If the binding inequality belongs
to (6), say lioj ¼ 0 while siojeB; we have to add strategy sioj to B: In both situations
there is a strategy sioj for which r
i
oj ¼ 0 and lioj ¼ 0: In general this leads to a kink in
the feasible path of the stochastic tracing procedure. This procedure is repeated over
and over again, until inequality (8) is binding and a stationary equilibrium is found.
Note that inequality (7) is only binding in the starting point.
6. Smoothing the stochastic tracing procedure
The previous section presents a method that can be used for the computation of a
stationary equilibrium. A potential drawback of that method is that one has to check
all the time whether the system of equations used is still appropriate by consulting
the inequalities, and if not, one has to switch to a different system of equations. This
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switching can be a serious problem in terms of computing time. There areQ
ði;oÞANO ð2m
i
o  1Þ different sets B; whereas each one of them may be generated
several times in the course of the algorithm.
We follow a suggestion in Garcia and Zangwill [7], also used in Herings and
Peeters [14], and formulate one, everywhere differentiable, homotopy by using a
well-chosen transformation of variables. Deﬁne, for aARm

;
riojðaÞ ¼ ½maxf0; aiojg2 and liojðaÞ ¼ ½maxf0;aiojg2:
After this transformation of variables, the system of equalities and inequalities
becomes
u˜iðt;o; rio ðaÞ; siojÞ þ d 

X
%oAO
*piðt; %o jo; rio ðaÞ; siojÞmi%o
þ liojðaÞ  mio ¼ 0 ðsiojASio;oAO; iANÞ;
liojðaÞX0; riojðaÞX0; liojðaÞriojðaÞ ¼ 0
ðsiojASio;oAO; iANÞ;X
siojAS
i
o
riojðaÞ  1 ¼ 0 ðoAO; iANÞ:
Owing to the proposed transformation of variables, the conditions liojðaÞX0;
riojðaÞX0 and liojðaÞriojðaÞ ¼ 0 are trivially satisﬁed. We can reformulate (in)equal-
ities in (1)–(8) that characterize the set OðG; p; BÞ by considering solutions
ðt; a; mÞAR Rm  Rnz; with aiojX0 if siojAB and aiojp0 if siojeB; to
ðaÞ u˜iðt;o; rio ðaÞ; siojÞ þ d 

P
%oAO
*piðt; %o jo; rio ðaÞ; siojÞmi%o
þliojðaÞ  mio ¼ 0 ðsiojASio;oAO; iANÞ;
ðbÞ P
siojAS
i
o
riojðaÞ  1 ¼ 0 ðoAO; iANÞ;
ðcÞ tX0;
ðdÞ t þ 1X0:
Notice that the same system of equalities and inequalities can be used, irrespective of
the set B: The role of B is taken over by the sign-combinations of the components
of the vector a:
Counting equations and unknowns in system (a)–(d) shows that there is one
degree of freedom, and therefore one expects a 1-dimensional solution set. Consider
any solution ðt; a; mÞ to (a)–(d). When aioj ¼ 0; then both riojðaÞ and liojðaÞ are zero.
This implies that there are exactly two admissible subsets of S for which the set of
(in)equalities (1)–(8) are satisﬁed. If along a solution curve aioj is increasing while
passing zero, then riojðaÞ gets positive and Bnew ¼ Bold,fsiojg: If aioj is decreasing
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while passing zero, then liojðaÞ gets negative and Bnew ¼ Bold\fsiojg: When aioj passes
zero, a kink appears in the method proposed in Section 5.
The left-hand sides of equalities (a)–(b) specify the homotopy H : ½0; 1  Rm 
Rnz-Rm
  Rnz;
Hðt; a; mÞ ¼
u˜iðt;o; rio ðaÞ; siojÞ þ d 

P
%oAO
*piðt; %o jo; rio ðaÞ; siojÞmi%o
þliojðaÞ  mio ¼ 0 ðsiojASio;oAO; iANÞP
siojAS
i
o
riojðaÞ  1 ¼ 0 ðoAO; iANÞ
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA:
The homotopy function H is continuously differentiable.8 The inequalities (c) and
(d) are satisﬁed as the homotopy takes ½0; 1 as the domain for the variable t: Further,
H has the salient feature that its zeros describe the stochastic tracing procedure,
ðt; a; mÞAH1ðf0gÞ if and only if ðt; rðaÞÞASðG; pÞ:
The setH1ðf0gÞ consists of ﬁnitely many differentiable arcs and loops. All arcs
start and end in f0; 1g  Rm  Rnz: Loops have no points in common with f0; 1g 
Rm
  Rnz: There is exactly one arc that starts in f0g  Rm  Rnz and that ends in
f1g  Rm  Rnz: All other arcs start and end in f1g  Rm  Rnz and connect two
points inducing stationary equilibria of the stochastic game G: Starting at the unique
point ð0; a0; m0ÞAH1ðf0gÞ at t ¼ 0 and following the path described by the zeros of
H; we end up in a point ð1; *a; *mÞAH1ðf0gÞ: This point generates the stationary
equilibrium rð*aÞ of G selected by the stochastic tracing procedure. See Fig. 4 for an
impression of the structure of H1ðf0gÞ:
The structure of H1ðf0gÞ is even simpler than the one of SðG; pÞ: Not only are
complications like bifurcations, spirals, higher dimensional solutions sets, diverging
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Fig. 4. The structure of H1ðf0gÞ:
8 If in the variable transformation instead of the power 2 the power k þ 1 was used, k-times
differentiability would have been obtained.
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behavior, etc., excluded. The arcs and loops in H1ðf0gÞ are differentiable
everywhere. It is the transformation of variables that smoothes out the kinks. As
a direct consequence, it is possible to calculate the derivative at each point of the
feasible path, which makes it possible to follow the path by means of many easily
implementable numerical methods, including methods to solve ordinary differential
equations.
7. Implementation
The stochastic game G0 naturally decomposes into n mutually independent and
separate Markov decision problems, one for each player. We have shown that
generically a Markov decision problem has a unique optimal pure stationary
strategy. The combination of all optimal strategies (for each player one) induces the
starting point of our algorithm. This point can be determined analytically since
there are ﬁnitely many pure stationary strategies in each decision problem. For each
player only the total discounted payoffs for each of his pure stationary strategies
have to be computed and it has to be checked which strategy generates the highest
payoff.
Once the starting point is determined, the numerical process starts to follow the
homotopy path from that point on. We have programmed a number of Fortran-
subroutines belonging to the software-package Hompack,9 a Fortran77 program
(see [37]). Hompack provides three qualitatively different algorithms for tracking the
zero curve of the homotopy: ordinary differential equation-based, normal ﬂow, and
augmented Jacobian matrix. In general, the ﬁrst algorithm is the most robust of the
three algorithms, but is also the slowest, sometimes by a wide margin. Being risk-
averse we used this algorithm, called ﬁxpdf, for implementation. ﬁxpdf is an ordinary
differential equation-based algorithm working with dense Jacobian matrices.
The homotopy path is parameterized by pathlength t: Thus t ¼ tðtÞ; a ¼ aðtÞ and
m ¼ mðtÞ along the homotopy path, and HðtðtÞ; aðtÞ;mðtÞÞ ¼ 0 identically in t: The
differential equation is characterized by
d
dt
HðtðtÞ; aðtÞ; mðtÞÞ ¼ @HðtðtÞ; aðtÞ; mðtÞÞ 

dt=dt
da=dt
dm=dt
0
B@
1
CA ¼ 0;
dt
dt
;
da
dt
;
dm
dt
 



















2
¼ 1;
and initial conditions given by
ðtð0Þ; að0Þ; mð0ÞÞ ¼H1ðf0gÞ-ðf0g  Rm  RnzÞ:
It follows that tð0Þ ¼ 0 and ðað0Þ; mð0ÞÞ corresponds to the best response to the prior.
The homotopy path is given by the trajectory of this initial value problem. When
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tð%tÞ ¼ 1; ðað%tÞ; mð%tÞÞ is a zeropoint of H and rðað%tÞÞ is a stationary equilibrium of
the stochastic game G with equilibrium payoff mð%tÞ: Complete details for solving the
initial value problem are given in [36,38].
The homotopy function that we implemented is the one as described in Section 6.
We consider stochastic games with up to z ¼ 5 states, n ¼ 5 players, and m ¼ 5
actions for each player in each state. The homotopy path to be followed is a one-
dimensional object in the real Euclidean space of dimension z  n  ðm þ 1Þ þ 1: It
may be possible to improve on computing times by rescaling utilities and
probabilities, or by using an a-transformation with a power different from 2 (but
greater than 1, to keep differentiability) or multiplied by a positive scalar different
from 1. An extensive digress on the optimal numerical implementation is beyond the
aim of the current paper.
Within each class of stochastic games characterized by a speciﬁc choice for m; n;
and z; we have generated ﬁve randomly chosen stochastic games and ﬁve randomly
chosen priors. All payoffs, transition probabilities, and priors are chosen
independently from one another out of the uniform distribution on ½0; 1: The
transition probabilities and the priors are normalized to sum up to 1. The discount
factor is ﬁxed at 0.95.
Table 1 reports the average as well as the standard deviation of the time needed to
compute a stationary equilibrium in a randomly generated game within the class of
stochastic games determined by a speciﬁc choice for m; n and z: The computations
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Table 1
Computation times in seconds
m/n 2 3 4 5
z ¼ 2
2 0.53 (0.11) 1.89 (0.99) 15.91 (13.46) 97.41 (84.32)
3 2.03 (0.62) 20.85 (6.97) 288.94 (129.96)
4 6.54 (1.58) 146.58 (55.01)
5 13.48 (3.31)
z ¼ 3
2 1.40 (0.19) 6.20 (1.72) 52.19 (11.40) 334.11 (238.43)
3 4.61 (1.35) 63.14 (29.10) 1319.33 (289.82)
4 21.20 (11.44) 1391.43 (737.45)
5 56.62 (21.71)
z ¼ 4
2 2.50 (0.74) 14.30 (4.85) 195.52 (203.70)
3 14.95 (5.90) 431.57 (144.94)
4 75.81 (41.45)
z ¼ 5
2 3.42 (0.85) 36.64 (12.40) 435.28 (211.68)
3 40.95 (33.00) 621.40 (258.84)
4 313.99 (292.18)
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were performed on a PC operating under Windows 98 with an Intel Pentium II
350 MHz processor and 64 Mb workspace. The computations are executed with an
end inaccuracy of 106: The path is followed within a range of inaccuracy of 104
except for the triples ðz; n; mÞAfð3; 3; 4Þ; ð4; 3; 3Þg where a maximal inaccuracy of
105 was needed in order to obtain convergence.
The average computation time increases most strongly in the number of players,
followed by the number of pure actions per player per state, and ﬁnally the number
of states. For instance, for the case with two pure actions per player per state and
two states, an increase in the number of players from 2 to 5 leads to an increase in
average computation time from 0.53 to 97.41. Fixing the number of players and the
number of states, but increasing m from 2 to 5 leads to an increase in computation
time from 0.53 to 13.48. Finally, when m and n equal 2, but z is increased from 2 to 5,
computation time increases from 0.53 to 3.42.
The strong dependence of computation time on the number of players
should not come as a surprise. Since the total number of equations to be solved
equals z  n  ðm þ 1Þ; of which z  n  m have degree n þ 1 and the remaining
z  n have degree 1, an increase in the number of players does not only give
rise to more equations, but also to more complicated equations. Computation time
depends also on the time it takes to evaluate the expected payoffs of all the players,
which in turn is related to the total number of pure action combinations. The latter
number is given by z  mn; so is linear in z and polynomial of degree n in m: It should
therefore also not come as a surprise that computation time increases faster in m
than in z:
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Appendix A. Proofs
To make the proofs as transparent as possible, we need some notations and
deﬁnitions from the theory of regular constraint sets as presented in [16], see also [11]
for the ﬁrst application of this theory in economics.
For some rX1 a subset M of Rm is called a k-dimensional Cr manifold with
generalized boundary (MGB), if for every %xAM there exists a Cr diffeomorphism
f : U-V ; where U is an open subset of Rm containing %x and V is open in Rm; and
some integer cð %xÞX0; such that fð %xÞ ¼ 0 and fðU-MÞ equals fyAV j yi ¼ 0; i ¼
1;y; m  k; and yiX0; i ¼ m  k þ 1;y; m  k þ cð %xÞg: If for every element %x of
an MGB M it holds that cð %xÞp1; then M is called a manifold with boundary and the
set of elements %x for which cð %xÞ ¼ 1 is a ðk  1Þ-dimensional manifold, called the
boundary of M:
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One way to show that a set is an MGB is by showing that it is a regular constraint
set. Let J1 and J2 be two ﬁnite index sets and let gj for all jAJ1 and hj for all jAJ2; be
Cr functions deﬁned on some open subset X of Rm: We deﬁne
M½g; h ¼ fxAX j gjðxÞ ¼ 0; 8jAJ1; and hjðxÞX0; 8jAJ2g:
For xAX we deﬁne the set J0ðxÞ ¼ f jAJ2 j hjðxÞ ¼ 0g: If for every %xAM½g; h it
holds that
f@xgjð %xÞ j jAJ1g,f@xhjð %xÞ j jAJ0ð %xÞg
is a set of independent vectors, then M½g; h is called a Cr regular constraint set
(RCS). In [16] it is shown that every Cr RCS is an ðm  jJ1jÞ-dimensional Cr MGB
with cð %xÞ ¼ jJ0ð %xÞj for every %xAM½g; h:
In this entire appendix, let a size vector Z; a transition mapping p; a discount
factor d; and a prior pAS be ﬁxed. For any tuple of utility functions u and any
admissible subset B; deﬁne the functions gB
;u :R1þ2m
þnz-R2m
þnz and
hB
;u :R1þ2m
þnz-Rm
þ2 in such a way that gB
;u equals the left-hand side of
equalities (1)–(4) and hB
;u the left-hand side of inequalities (5)–(8),
gB
;uðt; r; l; mÞ ¼
u˜iðt;o; rio ; siojÞ þ d 

P
%oAO
*piðt; %o jo; rio ; siojÞmi%o
þlioj  mio ðsiojASio;oAO; iANÞ
rioj ðsiojeBio;oAO; iANÞ
lioj ðsiojABio;oAO; iANÞP
siojAS
i
o
rioj  1 ðoAO; iANÞ
0
BBBBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCCCA
and
hB
;uðt; r; l; mÞ ¼
rioj ðsiojABio;oAO; iANÞ
lioj ðsiojeBio;oAO; iANÞ
t
t þ 1
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA:
A point ðt; r; l; mÞAOðG; p; BÞ is a solution of (1)–(8) if and only if gB;uðt;r; l; mÞ ¼
0 and hB
;uðt; r; l; mÞX0:
Let the functions gB

:R1þ2m
þnz  Rmn-R2mþnz and hB :R1þ2mþnz 
Rmn-Rm
þ2 be deﬁned such that gB
 ðt; r; l; m; uÞ ¼ gB;uðt; r; l; mÞ and
hB
 ðt; r; l; m; uÞ ¼ hB;uðt; r; l; mÞ for all uARmn: Fig. 5 presents the matrix of
derivatives of the functions gB

and hB

with respect to all variables, where
Eðði0;o0Þ; siojÞ ¼
1 if ði0;o0Þ ¼ ði;oÞ;
0 otherwise;

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@ui0 ðo0;si0
o0 ;s
i0
o0 j0 Þ
u˜iðt;o; rio ; siojÞ ¼ 0 if siojasi
0
o0j0 ; for all s
i0
o0 AS
i0
o0 ;
X
sio ASio
@uiðo;sio ;siojÞu˜
iðt;o; rio ; siojÞ ¼ 1:
The stars ð%Þ in the matrix need not to be speciﬁed for our analysis.
Each row in Fig. 5 corresponds to one of the equalities and inequalities in (1)–(8).
To make the ﬁgure more clear, derivatives with respect to r are ﬁrst taken for
siojAB
: The same applies to the derivatives with respect to l and the ordering of the
equalities in (1). From the properties of the matrix, it follows immediately that the
matrices @uu˜ and E have full row rank.
The structure of the proof of Theorem 5.2 is as follows. First, it is shown that for
almost all games u; M½gB;u; hB;u is a regular constraint set, from which the
manifold structure ofLðG; p; BÞ follows immediately. Next it is shown that there is
an open set of full measure for which the manifold structure holds. For the ﬁrst part
of the proof, we show that for almost all games u; for every %xAM½gB;u; hB;u;
f@xgB
;u
j ð %xÞ j jAJ1g,f@xhB
;u
j ð %xÞ j jAJ0ð %xÞg
is a set of independent vectors. To show this we need three lemmas, Lemmas A.1–
A.3. Lemma A.1 handles points %x for which J0ð %xÞ ¼ |; Lemma A.2 deals with points
%x such that the cardinality of J0ð %xÞ is one, and Lemma A.3 implies that J0ð %xÞ
contains one element at most.
Lemma A.1. Let a prior pAS and an admissible subset B of S be given. Then, for
almost all u; gB
;u f0g:10
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Fig. 5. The matrix of partial derivatives of gB
n
and hB
n
:
10Here, the symbol ‘ ’ denotes transversal intersection.
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Proof. Consider a point ð%t; %r; %l; %m; %uÞ such that gB ð%t; %r; %l; %m; %uÞ ¼ 0: The matrix of
partial derivatives of gB

at ð%t; %r; %l; %m; %uÞ is given by the rows (1)–(4) in Fig. 5. We
show ﬁrst that this matrix has full row rank, from which it follows that gB
 f0g:
Since @uu˜ð
Þ has full row rank and the derivative with respect to u in (2)–(4) is zero,
it is sufﬁcient to show that the part of the matrix given by (2)–(4) has full row rank.
Since the derivative with respect to l in (3) has full row rank, whereas the derivative
with respect to l in (2) and (4) is zero, it is sufﬁcient to show that the rows in (2) and
(4) are independent. The admissibility of B implies that the derivative with respect
to rB in (4) has full row rank. Since, the derivative with respect to rB in (2) is zero,
the only thing left to prove is that (2) has independent rows, which is obvious from
the derivative with respect to rS\B : Consequently, g
B f0g:
By the transversality theorem (see, for example, Mas-Colell [19, Theorem I.2.2])
and since gB

is a CN function, it follows that the complement of the set
fuARmn j gB;u f0gg has Lebesgue measure zero. &
Lemma A.2. Let a prior pAS and an admissible subset B of S be given. Moreover, let
an inequality j0Af1;y; m þ 2g be given. Then, for almost all u; ðgB;u; hB;uj0 Þ f0g:
Proof. Consider a point ð%t; %r; %l; %m; %uÞ such that gB ð%t; %r; %l; %m; %uÞ ¼ 0 and
hB

j0 ð%t; %r; %l; %m; %uÞ ¼ 0: The matrix of partial derivatives of ðgB

; hB

j0 Þ at ð%t; %r; %l; %m; %uÞ is
given in Fig. 5 by rows (1)–(4) and a single row related to hB

j0 in (5)–(8). We show
ﬁrst that this matrix has full row rank, from which it follows that ðgB ; hBj0 Þ f0g:
If row j0 belongs to (6), (7) or (8), then it follows from the derivative with respect to
lS\B or from the derivative with respect to t that row j0 has rank 1. Since all other
derivatives in row j0 are zero, it follows as in the proof of Lemma A.1 that the rows
of (1)–(4) together with row j0 are independent. Consider the case where row j0
belongs to (5). Following the ﬁrst part of the proof of Lemma A.1, it sufﬁces to
prove that (2) and (4) together with row j0 are independent. Inequality hB

j0 states that
rioj0X0; s
i
oj0AB
; and this inequality is now required to hold with equality. SinceP
siojAS
i
o
rioj  1 ¼ 0; it follows that jBioj ¼ jB-Sioj41: Then the row related to sioj0
together with (2) and (4) trivially form an independent set. Consequently,
ðgB ; hBj0 Þ f0g: By the transversality theorem it follows that the complement of
fuARmn j ðgB;u; hB;uj0 Þ f0gg has Lebesgue measure zero. &
Lemma A.3. Let a prior pAS and an admissible subset B of S be given. Moreover, let
inequalities j0; j00Af1;y; m þ 2g with j0aj00 be given. Then, for almost all vectors
u; ðgB;u; hB;uj0 ; hB
;u
j00 Þ f0g:
Proof. Consider a point ð%t; %r; %l; %m; %uÞ such that gB ð%t; %r; %l; %m; %uÞ ¼ 0; hBj0 ð%t; %r; %l; %m; %uÞ ¼
0; and hB

j00 ð%t; %r; %l; %m; %uÞ ¼ 0: The matrix of partial derivatives of ðgB

; hB

j0 ; h
B
j00 Þ at
ð%t; %r; %l; %m; %uÞ is given in Fig. 5 by rows (1)–(4) and two rows related to hBj0 and hB

j00
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in (5)–(8). We show ﬁrst that this matrix has full row rank, from which it follows
that ðgB ; hBj0 ; hB

j00 Þ f0g:
The case where the two rows are not equal to (7) and (8) is similar to the proof of
Lemma A.2. Rows (7) and (8) are not independent. However, they cannot be binding
simultaneously, because then it holds that t ¼ 0 and 1. Consequently,
ðgB ; hBj0 ; hB

j00 Þ f0g: It follows that the complement of the set fuARmn j ðgB
;u;
hB
;u
j0 ; h
B;u
j00 Þ f0gg has Lebesgue measure zero. &
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